Two striking facts on international capital flows for emerging economies motivate this paper: (1) Governments hold large amounts of international reserves, for which they obtain a return lower than their borrowing cost; (2) Purchases of domestic assets by non-residents and purchases of foreign assets by residents are both procyclical, and collapse during crises. We propose a model of endogenous default that can account for these facts. The government faces a trades-off between the benefits that reserves provide as a buffer against rollover risk, and the default premium of holding gross debt positions. Long-duration bonds, the countercyclical default premium, and sudden stops are important for the quantitative success of the model.
Introduction
The global financial crisis has brought cross-border capital flows to the center of policy debates. Many of these discussions have focused on the accumulation of international reserves in emerging markets. A widespread view is that international reserves are a valuable war chest against turbulence in financial markets (Feldstein, 1999; IMF, 2011) .
1 Others have argued that reserves impose large financial costs and that the reserve buildup has reached excessive levels (Rodrik, 2006) . Despite these extensive academic and policy debates, a quantitative theory of reserves accumulation remains elusive.
In this paper we propose a quantitative framework of optimal reserve management that accounts for two key facts of international capital flows:
Fact 1: Rate of Return Dominance. Governments hold large amounts of international
reserves, for which they obtain a return lower than their borrowing cost. 
Fact 2: Gross Capital Flows Dynamics. Purchases of domestic assets by non-residents and purchases of foreign assets by residents are both procyclical and collapse during crises.
These empirical regularities are documented in recent work by Broner et al. (2012) , who also discuss how these facts are difficult to reconcile with the predictions of existing models (see also Forbes and Warnock, 2011) .
We use a model of sovereign defaultable debtà la Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) augmented with reserves as our theoretical laboratory. We consider a benevolent government that borrows by issuing long-duration bonds, i.e., non-contingent bonds with geometrically decaying 1 Frankel and Saravelos (2010) , Dominguez et al. (2012) and Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2011) find that economies that had more reserves before the global financial crisis had milder contractions in economic activity during the crisis. coupons, and saves by investing in a risk-free asset, reserves. A government that defaults faces an output cost and is temporarily prevented from issuing new debt (but can change its reserve holdings). To capture disturbances in financial markets that are independent from the borrowing economy's fundamentals, we assume that the economy may be hit with a sudden-stop shock. During a sudden stop, the government cannot issue new debt. Sovereign bonds are priced by risk-neutral foreign investors who operate in competitive markets. Hence, in equilibrium, bond spreads reflect how both debt and reserves affect future incentives to repay.
We calibrate the model using Mexico as a reference, matching targets for the levels of debt and sovereign spread, the spread volatility, and the frequency and cost of sudden stops. In simulations of our model, the government holds reserves with a return lower than its borrowing cost (Fact 1). The average reserve holding is equivalent to 2/3 of the average short-term debt obligations (that mature within a year). This is not far from the "Greenspan-Guidotti rule" that prescribes full short-term debt coverage. Reserve holdings in the simulations are equivalent to 1/3 of the average holdings in Mexico between 1994 and 2011. Additional experiments in which reserves lower the arrival probability of a sudden-stop can account for the entire reserve holdings in Mexico.
Why does the government hold international reserves with a return lower than its borrowing cost instead of allocating reserves to pay down its debt? In our setup, reserves provide insurance against future increases in the borrowing cost. When a government takes financial decisions, it considers not only the current borrowing cost but also the evolution of future borrowing costs. By simultaneously issuing long-duration bonds and buying reserves the government accumulates resources that it can use in future periods with a high borrowing cost. The downside of buying reserves is that they provide a return lower than the borrowing cost. However, if there is a significant probability that the borrowing cost will increase in the future, the government may be willing to pay the financial cost of reserve accumulation.
Long-duration bonds are key for hedging rollover risk. Issuing one-period debt to finance reserves accumulation only increases the-government's next-period net-asset position if the government defaults. That is, with one-period debt, issuing debt and accumulating reserves only allows the government to transfer resources to future periods in which it defaults. In contrast, with long-duration debt, issuing debt and accumulating reserves also allows the government to transfer resources to future periods in which the borrowing cost is high but there is no default. With our benchmark calibration but with one-period debt, the government does not choose significant reserve holdings (this is in line with the findings presented by Alfaro and Kanczuk, 2009 ).
Another key result in our model simulations is that purchases of domestic assets by non-residents, i.e., government debt, and purchases of foreign assets by residents, i.e. international reserves, are both procyclical and collapse during crises (Fact 2).
3 The key to account for Fact 2 is the countercyclical nature of default risk. Consistently with the data, 3 They show that in emerging economies changes in reserves represent about half of purchases of foreign assets by domestic agents and contract significantly during crisis episodes. In addition, they show that debt inflows play a primary role in accounting for changes in non-resident purchases of domestic assets over the business cycle and during crises. Dominguez et al. (2012) document the procyclical behavior of reserves around the global financial crisis.
the model produces a lower sovereign spread in good times, reflecting the lower incentives to default.
4 The lower default risk provides an incentive for the government to borrow more and buy more reserves in good times. Moreover, sudden stops lead the government to cut on borrowing and use reserves to smooth out consumption. This results in a collapse of both inflows and outflows during sudden stops.
Related Literature
We build on the quantitative sovereign default literature that follows Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008) . Within this literature, we share with Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012), Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) , and Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) the emphasis on long-duration debt. With the notable exception of Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009) , other studies in this literature do not allow for the joint accumulation of assets and liabilities. Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009) show that while reserve accumulation is a theoretical possibility with default risk, the government's optimal policy does not feature simultaneous reserve accumulation and debt issuance for plausible parameterizations. The stark difference between our results and theirs arises because their analysis only allows for one-period debt.
As explained above, it is the combination of long-duration bonds and reserves that allow the government to hedge against future increases in the borrowing cost.
Several other studies analyze hedging against rollover risk. Jeanne and Ranciere (2011) develop a model where the government can issue insurance contracts that pay off during a sudden stop. They analytically derive the demand for these contracts, and show that this demand could be significant, depending on the probability and the size of the sudden stop. Caballero and Panageas (2008) show that there would be substantial welfare gains from having access to financial instruments that provide insurance against both the occurrence of sudden stop and changes in the sudden-stop probability. In contrast, we choose to focus on a more empirically relevant case in which reserves payoffs are not contingent to the realization 4 As reported by Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006) , in emerging economies, government bond yields rise during economic contractions and are reduced during economic expansions (the correlation between GDP and sovereign bond spreads range between 0 and -0.8). Moreover, government bond yields are about 50 percent more volatile than in developed economies, which is indicative of the importance of rollover risk for emerging economies.
of the sudden-stop shock. Durdu, Mendoza, and Terrones (2009) present a dynamic precautionary savings model where higher sudden-stop risk can account for a significant increase in the net foreign asset position. Aizenman and Lee (2007) develop a Diamond-Dybvig type model with an exogenous debt level where reserves serve as liquidity when a sudden stop hits. Hur and Kondo (2011) develop a learning framework of the sudden stop process to account for the increase in reserves over the last decade. Overall, our paper contributes to this literature by providing a unified framework to study reserves, debt, and sovereign spreads.
Our paper is also related to Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004) . They show examples where issuing non-defaultable long-term debt and accumulating short-term assets can replicate the complete market allocations.
5 In their closed-economy models, changes in the interest rate arise due to fluctuations in the marginal rate of substitution of domestic consumers. In contrast, in our model, fluctuations in the interest rate reflect changes in the default premium that foreign investors demand to be compensated for the possibility of government default. Moreover, default risk introduces an additional cost of accumulating reserves, which we see as particularly relevant for emerging markets.
Our work is also related to the literature on household debt. In particular, Telyukova (2011) and Telyukova and Wright (2008) address the "credit card puzzle", i.e., the fact that households pay high interest rates on credit cards while earning low rates on bank accounts.
Both the "credit card puzzle" and the "reserve accumulation puzzle" are examples of the "rate of return dominance puzzle". However, there are important differences between our environment and their work. In their models, the demand for assets arises because credit cards cannot be used to buy some goods. Rollover risk and long-duration bonds are the key elements behind our theory.
Another strand of the literature focuses on exchange rate motive for reserve accumulation the (see Dooley et al., 2003, and Benigno and Fornaro, 2012) . We analyze instead the effects of rollover risk on the demand for international reserves, excluding other reasons for reserve accumulation (that could be relevant in accounting for the data). The importance of rollover The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an example that highlights the key mechanism behind reserve accumulation. The quantitative model, its calibration, and results are presented in Sections 3, 4, and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
A Three-Period Example
We first present a three-period model that allows us to illustrate the importance of rollover risk and long-duration bonds in accounting for the joint accumulation of debt and reserves. To simplify the analysis we consider only exogenous rollover risk, and abstract from endogenous rollover risk due to the possibility of default. 
Environment
The economy lasts for three periods t = 0, 1, 2. The government receives a deterministic The government is subject to a sudden stop shock in period 1. When a sudden stop occurs, the government is unable to borrow. A sudden stop occurs with probability π ∈ [0, 1]. In the first period, the government can accumulate reserves. The interest rate the government earns on its reserves is denoted by r a ≥ 0 and the interest rate it pays when it borrows is denoted by r b ≥ r a .
A bond issued in period 0 promises to pay one unit of the good in period 1 and (1 − δ) units in period 2. Thus, the price of a bond issued in period 0 is given by
Note that if δ = 1, the government issues one-period bonds in period 0. If δ < 1, we say that the government issues long-duration bonds in period 0. We assume that δ > 0. That is, we assume that, for debt issued in period 0, period-2 payments cannot be larger than period-1 payments. This assumption allows us to rule out reserve accumulation in period 1 and, thus, simplifies the exposition. A bond issued in period 1 promises to pay one unit of the good in period 2. Let b t denote the number of bonds issued by the government in period t and a denote the amount of reserves the government accumulates in period 0.
Thus, the budget constraints are:
Results
Without rollover risk, the government would simply consume
However, a sudden-stop shock prevents the government from borrowing in period 1 and 
If
Then, the government accumulates reserves in period 0 (a > 0). Moreover, if r a = r b , the government perfectly smooths consumption.
Proof: See Appendix
Proposition 1 states that, there is a fundamental role for reserves only in the presence of both rollover risk and long-duration bonds. 7 Without rollover risk, there is no need for reserve accumulation: the government can always transfer resources from period 2 to period 1 directly. If there is a sudden stop in period 1, the government cannot borrow in that period. Therefore, the government may benefit from issuing long-duration bonds to transfer resources from period 2 to period 0, and then transfer period-2 resources from period 0 to period 1 using reserves. With one-period debt, the government cannot improve its period-1 net asset position by issuing debt and accumulating reserves in period 0.
With rollover risk and long-duration bonds, the government accumulates reserves if the benefits from transferring resources from period 0 to period 1 using reserves are high enough to compensate for the financial cost of financing reserve accumulation with debt issuances.
Condition (1) The financial cost of transferring resources from period 0 to period 1 by issuing debt to finance reserve accumulation appears if r a < r b . Note that, with rollover risk and long-duration bonds, condition (1) holds when r b = r a (the left-hand side of condition (1) is positive and the right-hand side is equal to zero).
Long-duration bonds and a high enough rollover risk (high enough π) are necessary for condition (1) to hold. With one-period debt (δ = 1), the left-hand side of condition (1) is equal to zero and the right-hand side is positive. Furthermore, the government is willing to pay the financial cost of issuing debt for accumulating reserves if the probability of not being able to transfer resources directly from period 2 to period 1 (π) is high enough. Recall reserves are beneficial because they increase consumption in the state in which period-1 borrowing is not possible, which occurs with probability π. In particular, note that condition (1) is not satisfied with π = 0, and is satisfied with π = 1 (and long-duration bonds).
Summing up, this section illustrates how rollover risk could play a role in accounting for reserve accumulation, and how debt duration could be a key factor for determining the importance of this role. We next study a richer model that allows us to gauge the quantitative importance of rollover risk in accounting for reserve accumulation. In this model, an endogenous sovereign default premium implies that the return on reserves is lower than the interest rate the government pays for its debt, and rollover risk arises because of both changes in the default premium (that reflect changes in the economy's fundamentals) and sudden stops (unrelated to the economy's fundamentals).
Model
This section presents a dynamic small-open-economy model in which the government can issue non-state contingent defaultable debt and buy risk-free assets. The economy's endowment of the single tradable good is denoted by y ∈ Y ⊂ R ++ . This endowment follows a Markov process.
We consider a benevolent government that maximizes:
where E denotes the expectation operator, β denotes the subjective discount factor, and c t represents consumption of private agents. The utility function is strictly increasing and concave.
The timing of events within each period is as follows. First, the income and sudden-stop shocks (to be described below) are realized. After observing these shocks, the government chooses whether to default on its debt and makes its portfolio decision subject to constraints imposed by the sudden-stop shock and its default decision. Figure 2 summarizes the timing of these events.
Figure 2:
Sequence of events when the government is not in default. The government enters the period with debt b t and reserves a t . First, the income and sudden-stop shocks are realized. Second, the government chooses whether to default. Third, the government adjust its debt and reserves positions. The government can always adjust reserve holdings and buy back debt. It can issue debt only if it did not default and is not in a sudden stop.
The sudden-stop shock follows a Markov process so that a sudden stop starts with probability π ∈ [0, 1] and ends with probability ψ s ∈ [0, 1]. During a sudden stop, the government cannot issue new debt, and suffers an income loss of ϕ s (y). However, the government can buy back debt and change its reserve holdings while in a sudden stop.
The sudden-stop shock in our model captures dislocations to international credit markets that are exogenous to local conditions. Thus, for given domestic fundamentals, a sudden stop can trigger changes in sovereign spreads and default episodes. This is important for the empirical success of the model because of a vast empirical literature showing that extreme capital flow episodes are typically driven by global factors (see, for instance, Calvo et al., 1993 , Uribe and Yue, 2006 and Forbes and Warnock, 2011 . The loss in output triggered by a sudden stop is also consistent with empirical studies (e.g. Calvo et al., 1993) and can be rationalized by the adverse effects of these episodes on the banking and corporate sectors.
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As in Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) and Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) , we assume that a bond issued in period t promises an infinite stream of coupons that decrease at a constant rate δ. In particular, a bond issued in period t promises to pay (1 − δ) j−1 units of the tradable good in period t + j, for all j ≥ 1. Hence, debt dynamics can be represented as follows:
where b t is the number of coupons due at the beginning of period t, and i t is the number of bonds issued in period t.
Let a t ≥ 0 denote the government's reserve holdings at the beginning of period t. The budget constraint conditional on having access to credit markets is represented as follows:
where q t is the price of the bond issued by the government, which in equilibrium will depend on exogenous shocks and the policy pair (b t+1 , a t+1 ), and 1 + r is the per period return on reserves.
9
When the government defaults, it does so on all current and future debt obligations. This is consistent with the observed behavior of defaulting governments and it is a standard assumption in the literature. 10 As in most previous studies, we also assume that the recovery rate for debt in default (i.e., the fraction of the loan lenders recover after a default) is zero.
11
A default event triggers exclusion from credit markets for a stochastic number of periods.
Income is given by y − ϕ d (y) in every period in which the government is excluded from credit markets because of a default. Thus, the income level of an economy in default is independent of whether the economy is facing a sudden stop. This implies that the income loss triggered by a default is effectively lower for an economy facing a sudden stop (since the sudden-stop income would be y − ϕ s (y) in case the government repays). This assumption is justified because the income losses during both defaults and sudden stops intend to capture local disturbances caused by the loss of access to international credit markets. This assumption also allows the model to capture that some but not all sudden stops trigger defaults. The government does not have access to debt markets in the default period and then regains access to debt markets with constant probability
Foreign investors are risk-neutral and discount future payoffs at the rate r (which is also the rate of return on reserves). Bonds are priced in a competitive market inhabited by a large number of identical lenders, which implies that bond prices are pinned down by a zero-expected-profit condition.
The government cannot commit to future (default, borrowing, and saving) decisions.
Thus, one may interpret this environment as a game in which the government making decisions in period t is a player who takes as given the (default, borrowing, and saving) strategies of other players (governments) who will decide after t. We focus on Markov Perfect
Equilibrium. That is, we assume that in each period the government's equilibrium default, borrowing, and saving strategies depend only on payoff-relevant state variables.
10 Sovereign debt contracts often contain an acceleration clause and a cross-default clause. The first clause allows creditors to call the debt they hold in case the government defaults on a debt payment. The cross-default clause states that a default in any government obligation constitutes a default in the contract containing that clause. These clauses imply that after a default event, future debt obligations become current.
11 Yue (2010) and Benjamin and Wright (2008) present models with endogenous recovery rates.
Recursive Formulation
We now describe the recursive formulation of the government's optimization problem.
The sudden-stop shock is denoted by s, with s = 1 (s = 0) indicating that the economy is (is not) in a sudden-stop.
Let V denote the value function of a government that is not currently in default. For any bond price function q the function V satisfies the following functional equation:
where the government's value of repaying is given by
subject to
The value of defaulting is given by:
The solution to the government's problem yields decision rules for defaultd (b, a, y, s) , debt
indicates that the government is (is not) in default. The default ruled(·) is equal to 1 if the government defaults, and is equal to 0 otherwise. In a rational expectations equilibrium (defined below), investors use these decision rules to price debt contracts. Because investors are risk neutral, the bond-price function solves the following functional equation:
where
Condition (5) indicates that in equilibrium, an investor has to be indifferent between selling a government bond today and investing in a risk-free asset, and keeping the bond and selling it next period. If the investor keeps the bond and the government does not default in the next period, he first receives a one unit coupon payment and then sells the bonds at market price, which is equal to (1 − δ) times the price of a bond issued next period. (2), (3), and (4).
Recursive Equilibrium
ii. given policy rules
, the bond price function q satisfies condition (5).
Calibration
The utility function displays a constant coefficient of relative risk aversion, i.e.,
The endowment process follows:
with |ρ| < 1, and ε t ∼ N (0, σ 2 ϵ ). Following Arellano (2008) , we assume an asymmetric cost of default ϕ d (y), so that it is proportionally more costly to default in good times. This is a property of the endogenous default cost in Mendoza and Yue (2012) and, as shown by Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) , allows the equilibrium default model to match the behavior of the spread in the data. In particular, we assume a quadratic loss function for income during a default episode ϕ Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) .
We also assume that the income loss during a sudden stop is a fraction of the income loss after a default: ϕ s (y) = λϕ d (y). With this assumption, we have to pin down only one more parameter value in order to determine the cost of sudden stops. Since both sovereign defaults and sudden stops are associated with disruptions in the availability of private credit, it is natural to assume that the cost of these events is higher in good times when investment financed by credit is more productive. We use Mexico as a reference for choosing the parameters that governs the endowment process, the level and duration of debt, and the mean and standard deviation of spread.
This choice is guided by the fact that business cycles in Mexico display the same properties that are observed in small open developing economies (see Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) , Neumeyer and Perri (2005) , and Uribe and Yue (2006) ). Unless we explain otherwise, we compare simulation results with data from Mexico from the first quarter of 1980 to the fourth quarter of 2011. Therefore, the parameter values that govern the endowment process are chosen so as to mimic the behavior of GDP in Mexico during that period. Income cost of sudden stops λ 0.5
We set δ = 3.3%. With this value, bonds have an average duration of 5 years in the simulations, which is roughly the average debt duration observed in Mexico according to Cruces et al. (2002) . 12 As in Mendoza and Yue (2012) , we assume an average duration of sovereign default events of three years (ψ d = 0.083), in line with the duration estimated in Dias and Richmond (2007) .
As in Jeanne and Ranciere (2011), we define a sudden stop in the data as an annual fall in net capital inflows of more than 5 percent of GDP. Using this definition, the same sample of countries considered by Jeanne and Ranciere (2011) , and the IMF's International Financial Statistics annual data from 1970 to 2011, we find one sudden stop every ten years (as they do). Thus, we set π = 0.025.
12 We use the Macaulay definition of duration that, with the coupon structure in this paper, is given by D = We set ψ s to match the duration of sudden stops in the data. We estimate the duration of sudden stops using quarterly data from 1970 to 2011. We define ca t as the ratio of cumulated net capital inflows over the last four quarters to cumulated GDP over the last four quarters. 13 We identify quarters in which ca t+4 < ca t − 0.05. For such quarters, a sudden stop episode begins the first quarter between t and t + 4 in which ca t falls. This sudden stop ends the first period in which ca t increases. Following this methodology, we find a mean duration of a sudden stop of 1.12 years, and set accordingly ψ s = 0.25. 14 These parameter values are similar to the ones we would have obtained using only data for Mexico, which has experienced three sudden stops since 1979 with an average duration of 1.4 years.
The appendix presents the list of sudden stops we identify and the evolution of net capital inflows for each country in our sample.
We need to calibrate the value of four other parameters: the discount factor β, the In order to compute the sovereign spread implicit in a bond price, we first compute the yield i an investor would earn if it holds the bond to maturity (forever) and no default is declared. This yield satisfies
13 Net capital inflows are measured as the deficit in the current account minus the accumulation of reserves and related items.
14 This estimation is close to the results obtained by Forbes and Warnock (2011) who use gross capital inflows. Jeanne and Ranciere (2011) do not report the duration of sudden stops. 15 The time series for the spread is taken from Neumeyer and Perri (2005) The sovereign spread is the difference between the yield i and the risk-free rate r. We report the annualized spread
Debt levels in the simulations are calculated as the present value of future payment obligations discounted at the risk-free rate, i.e., b t (1 + r)(δ + r) −1 .
Computation
We solve for the equilibrium of the finite-horizon version of our economy, as in Hatchondo et al. (2010) . That is, the approximated value and bond price functions correspond to the ones in the first period of a finite horizon economy with a number of periods large enough that the maximum deviation between the value and bond price functions in the first and second period is no larger than 10 −6 . The recursive problem is solved using value function iteration. We solve the optimal portfolio allocation in each state by searching over a grid of debt and reserve levels and then using the best portfolio on that grid as an initial guess in a nonlinear optimization routine. The value functions V D and V R and the function that indicates the equilibrium bond price function conditional on repayment q
) are approximated using linear interpolation over y and cubic spline interpolation over debt and reserves positions. We use 20 grid points for reserves, 20 grid points for debt, and 25 grid points for income realizations. Expectations are calculated using 50 quadrature points for the income shocks.
Quantitative Results
We start the quantitative analysis by showing that the model simulations match the calibration targets and other non-targeted moments in the data. We also show that the model generates joint debt and reserve accumulation together with a significant default premium (Fact 1), and gross capital flows dynamics consistent with the ones in the data (Fact 2). We then show that long-duration bonds, sudden stops, and the endogenous and countercyclical default risk are important ingredients for the quantitative success of the model. Before concluding, we show that the model generates more reserve accumulation when we allow reserves to lower the probability of sudden stops. 
Model Simulations

Reserve Accumulation
As indicated in Table 2 , in the model simulations an indebted government paying a significant spread chooses to hold a significant amount of international reserves (Fact 1).
Average reserve holdings in the simulations represent 66 percent of short-term debt (i.e., debt maturing within a year). Interestingly, this is quite close to the "Greenspan-Guidotti rule" often targeted by policymakers, which prescribes full short-term debt coverage. Note: The standard deviation of x is denoted by σ (x). The coefficient of correlation between x and z is denoted by ρ (x, z). Changes in debt and reserves levels are denoted by ∆a and ∆b, respectively. Moments are computed using detrended series. Trends are computed using the HodrickPrescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 1, 600. Moments for the simulations correspond to the mean value of each moment in 250 simulation samples, with each sample including 120 periods (30 years) without a default episode. Default episodes are excluded to improve comparability with the data; our samples start at least five years after a default. Consumption and income are expressed in logs. Due to data availability, debt statistics are at annual frequency.
the sudden-stop probability and shows that simulations of the extended model can account for up to 100 percent of the average reserve holdings in Mexico. Of course, as mentioned in the introduction, motives for reserve accumulation other than rollover risk that are not discussed in this paper could also be important to account for a fraction of reserve holdings. Table 2 shows that purchases of domestic assets by non-residents (changes in debt levels) and purchases of foreign assets by residents (changes in reserve levels) are both procyclical in the simulations. This is consistent with recent evidence presented in Broner et al. (2012) (Fact 2).
Capital Flows Over the Cycle and During Sudden Stops
The procyclicality of reserve accumulation and debt issuances is a consequence of the effect of income on the availability of credit. Figure 3 illustrates how borrowing conditions deteriorate when income falls. As illustrated with the three-period model presented in Section 2, the government borrows more and accumulates reserves when borrowing conditions are good in order to hedge rollover risk. The government borrows less and sells reserves when borrowing conditions deteriorate. Thus, given the positive effect of income on borrowing conditions, changes in debt and reserves levels are both procyclical.
To illustrate the mechanism, Figure 4 presents the policy functions for debt (left panel) and reserve accumulation (right panel) as a function of current income. The policies correspond to the case in which, at the beginning of the period, the government is not in default and holds an initial level of debt and reserves equal to the mean levels observed in the simulations. The straight (broken) line indicates the demand for reserves when the economy is (is not) in a sudden stop. In all the figures, we express debt and reserves normalized by annualized output so that all expressions can be understood as fractions of GDP.
The vertical dotted lines correspond to the default threshold that separate repayment region and default region. When the government is not hit by a sudden stop shock, the government repays the debt for shocks to income higher than −5.2 percent and defaults otherwise. The fact that the default region is decreasing in the level of income is standard in the literature and reflects the fact that repayment is more costly for low income levels and that the punishment is also lower. Moreover, the default threshold when the economy is in The solid dots present the spread and debt levels chosen by the government when it starts the period with debt and reserves levels equal to the mean levels observed in the simulations (for which it does not default). a sudden stop is strictly higher, i.e., the government is more likely to default if it faces a sudden stop. This reflects the fact that default entails less of a punishment during a sudden stop as the government already faces restrictions to credit market and output losses due to the sudden stop.
When the economy is not in a sudden stop and the economy is in the repayment region, both borrowing and reserves are increasing with respect to income. In particular, notice that the government increases reserves when income is above trend. The permanent income hypothesis would imply that borrowing should instead be decreasing with respect to income.
However, because income is persistent, a high current income improves borrowing opportunities ( Figure 3 ) and leads to more borrowing. Once the government is allowed to accumulate reserves, there is an extra motive for borrowing more when income is higher: financing reserve accumulation to hedge rollover risk. In the default region, the government sells reserves (and debt levels are equal to zero).
Figure 4 also shows that a sudden stop causes a reduction in borrowing and reserve accumulation. During a sudden stop, the government sells reserves and makes coupon payments.
As illustrated by the flat policy function for borrowing, the government is constrained and does not repurchase debt. Notice that changes in reserves are slightly decreasing in the level of income, reflecting the fact that the governments expects a low future interest rate when it regains access to credit markets. 
Role of Long-Duration Bonds
We next show how assuming that the government can issue long-duration bonds plays a critical role in allowing the model to simultaneously generate significant levels of debt and reserves. Table 3 presents simulation results for our benchmark calibration, but assuming one-period bonds (δ = 1) instead of long-duration bonds. 16 The table shows that the mean debt-to-income ratio in the simulations drops to 3 percent of annual income, compared with 42 percent in the simulations with long-duration bonds, and reserves drop to 0.01 percent compared with 2.5 percent in the benchmark.
There are three fundamental reasons to to explain why the presence of long-duration bonds influence incentives for reserve accumulation in the simulations. First, long-duration bonds are essential for the role of reserves to transfer resources from the future to the present Mean reserves-to-GDP 2.5 0.01
Mean r s 3.4 0.0
and hedge against rollover risk. As we showed in in Section 2, with one-period bonds there is no role to insure against future increases in the borrowing costs.
Second, with one-period debt, the government chooses low debt levels for which default risk is negligible. Therefore, the expansion in the consumption space spanned by portfolios with positive reserves is unlikely to be significant. With one-period bonds, the government has to roll over (or pay back) 100 percent of its debt each quarter. Hence, a government facing a sudden stop or a sharp increase in spreads would have to use a large fraction of its income (160 percent of its quarterly income to repay the average value of debt in the data).
Because investors will charge a high spread anticipating government default, the government chooses instead low debt levels that imply a negligible default probability. In contrast, with long-duration bonds reserve holdings of 2.5 percent of income represent 66 percent of the average short-term debt and, thus, provide meaningful insurance against increases in the borrowing cost.
Third, long-duration bonds also changes the link between reserve accumulation and the current cost of borrowing. This can be illustrated by considering the Euler equation with respect to reserves:
The term (∂q t /∂a t+1 )) reflects how the reserve accumulation choices of the government affect the price at which the government issues new debt in equilibrium and is key to determine whether the government accumulates reserves. Figure 6 shows that in our benchmark model larger reserve holdings tends to improve the government's current borrowing opportunities, providing larger incentives to accumulate reserves. This does not happen in a model with one-period debt (see Alfaro and Kanczuk, 2009 ) where a Bulow-Rogoff type argument causes spreads to be increasing in the level of reserves. In particular, higher reserves reduces the cost of defaulting because autarchy becomes relatively more attractive as reserves enable the government to smooth out the fall in consumption implied by the income loss of default.
Thus, as illustrated in the left panel of Figure 7 , the next-period default probability increases when the government accumulates more reserves in the current period. In a model with oneperiod debt, the spread increases with the next-period default probability. ) available to a government that starts the period with the mean income and that does not face a sudden stop in the current period. Solid dots indicate optimal choices conditional on the assumed value of a ′ . The right panel presents the spread the government would pay if it chooses the optimal borrowing level and different levels of reserves, r Effect of reserves on next-period default probability and borrowing.
The left panel presents the next-period default probability
. Solid dots mark the optimal choice of reserves when initial debt and reserves levels are equal to the mean levels in the simulations (â (b ,ā, y, 0 ) ). The right panel presents the optimal debt choiceb (b , a, y, 0 ) as a function of initial reserve holdings (a), assuming that the initial debt stock equals the mean debt stock in the simulations.
In a model with long-duration debt, current spread reflects not only next-period default probability but also default probabilities in other future periods. The right panel of Figure   7 shows that accumulating reserves in the current period tends to lower borrowing in the next period. Thus, higher reserve holdings at the end of the period lead creditors to expect lower future debt levels, which in turn leads them to expect lower default probabilities in other future periods. Figure 6 shows that the effect of reserves on the next-period default probability may be dominated by their effects on the default probability in other future periods, in which case the spread decreases with respect to reserve holdings.
Role of Sudden Stops
We now present sensitivity analysis with respect to the frequency and cost of sudden stops. All remaining parameters take the same values of our benchmark calibration.
The top panel of Mean reserves-to-GDP 0.4 2.5 2.8 3.6
Cost of sudden stop λ = 0 λ = 0.25 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.75
Mean debt-to-GDP 43 43 42 39
Mean reserves-to-GDP 1.0 1.8 2.5 3.1
Note: cells in boldface correspond to the benchmark parameterization.
in accounting for reserve accumulations in our benchmark: without sudden stops, reserve holdings decline from 2.5 percent of income in the benchmark to 0.4 percent. The lower panel of Table 4 presents simulation results for different magnitudes of income losses while in sudden stop. The table shows that for a higher sudden-stop cost, the government chooses both higher reserve holdings and lower debt levels.
It has been argued that the surge in reserve holdings during the past decade could be related to an increase in the likelihood or size of shocks (see, for example, Ghosh et al., 2012) .
Results in Table 4 suggest that the quantitative contribution of sudden stops becoming more frequent and/or more disruptive to an increase in optimal reserves accumulation to hedge rollover risk could be indeed significant.
Role of the Endogenous and Countercyclical Spread
We now show that the endogenous and countercyclical sovereign spread plays a key role in generating demand for reserves in our model. To gauge the importance of allowing for an endogenous and countercyclical sovereign spread, we solve a version of the model without the default option. In this case income shocks do not affect the government's borrowing opportunities, which implies that there is no time-varying endogenous rollover risk associated with the possibility of default. The government continues to face sudden stops and pays a constant and exogenous spread for its debt issuances. Because of sudden stops and the presence of long-duration bonds, gross asset positions are relevant despite the lack of default risk. Formally, we solve the following recursive problem:
, r * represents the interest rate demanded by investors to buy sovereign bonds, andB is an exogenous debt limit. The values of r * andB are chosen to replicate the mean spread and debt levels in Mexico (also targeted in our benchmark calibration).
Remaining parameter values are identical to the ones used in our benchmark calibration. dicates that the endogenous source of rollover risk is important in accounting for reserve accumulation. Simulated reserve holdings decline from 2.5 percent of income in the benchmark to 0.1 percent with an exogenous and constant sovereign spread. Two factors are important for this result. First, rollover risk is lower in the no-default model because borrowing opportunities are independent from the income shock. Second, a model with the spread level observed in the data but without default overstates the financial cost of accumulating reserves financed by borrowing. In a default model, since the government always receives the return from reserve holdings but does not always pay back its debt, the financial cost of accumulating reserves financed by borrowing is lower than in a no-default model with the same spread. 
Reserve Accumulation for Crisis Prevention
In this subsection we show how the optimal level of reserves increases when we assume reserves are useful for preventing sudden stops. This assumption is consistent with recent evidence (see e.g., Calvo et al., 2012) showing that international reserves reduce the likelihood of a sudden stop.
18 Following Jeanne and Ranciere (2011), we assume that the probability of a sudden stop is given byπ
(1−δ) t−1 (1+r) t denotes the level of short-term debt, i.e., debt obligations maturing within the next year, and G denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Note that our benchmark calibration is a special case of equation (7) with w = 0.
We assume that m is such that the probability of a sudden stop is 10 percent (our benchmark target) when w = 0. Jeanne and Ranciere (2011) . As in the previous sensitivity analyses, all other parameters take the values used in our benchmark calibration. Table 6 shows that as we allow reserves to be more effective in reducing the probability of a sudden stop, optimal reserve holdings increase. In particular, when w = 0.15, the model replicates the average 18 In contrast, several previous empirical studies do not find evidence of reserves significantly reducing the probability of a sudden stop (e.g., Jeanne, 2007) . The relationship between reserves and the probability of a sudden stop is difficult to estimate: sudden stops are relatively rare events and the relationship between sudden stops and economic fundamentals may differ across countries. Several studies using a broader definition of crises do find that higher levels of reserves are associated with a lower crisis probability (see Berg et al., 2005 , Frankel and Saravelos, 2010 , Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2011 Note: cells in boldface correspond to the benchmark parameterization.
reserve level in Mexico. At that value of reserves, the government reduces the frequency of sudden stops from 10 episodes every 100 years to 6 episodes every 100 years.
Conclusions
The contribution of this paper is to present a quantitative model that accounts for salient features of international capital flows: (1) indebted governments hold large amounts of international reserves even though the yield of the debt they issue is significantly higher than the return they obtain from holding reserves; (2) non-resident purchases of domestic assets and purchases of foreign assets by domestic agents are both procyclical and collapse during crises.
We show that long-duration bonds, sudden stops, and an endogenous and countercyclical default risk are key ingredients for the quantitative success of the model.
Looking forward, our analysis suggests several avenues for further research. For instance, it would be interesting to study the interaction of the debt maturity structure and reserve holdings. In addition, the mechanisms studied in this paper could be relevant for understanding the financial decisions of corporate borrowers facing rollover risk.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Without rollover risk, the optimal allocation is such that c 1 = y 1 + y 2 (1 + ) .
Condition (1) states that the left-hand side of condition (8) 
